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Abstract
Background: Spot pricing is considered as a significant supplement for building a full-fledged market economy for the Cloud
ecosystem. However, it seems that both providers and consumers are still hesitating to enter the Cloud spot market. The relevant
academic community also has conflicting opinions about Cloud spot pricing in terms of revenue generation.
Aim: This work aims to systematically identify, assess, synthesize and report the published evidence in favor of or against spot-price
scheme compared with fixed-price scheme of Cloud computing, so as to help relieve the aforementioned conflict.
Method: We employed the systematic literature review (SLR) method to collect and investigate the empirical studies of Cloud spot
pricing indexed by major electronic libraries.
Results: This SLR identified 61 primary studies that either delivered discussions or conducted experiments to perform comparison
between spot pricing and fixed pricing in the Cloud domain. The reported benefits and limitations were summarized to facilitate
cost-benefit analysis of being a Cloud spot pricing player, while four types of theories were distinguished to help both researchers
and practitioners better understand the Cloud spot market.
Conclusions: This SLR shows that the academic community strongly advocates the emerging Cloud spot market. Although there is
still a lack of practical and easily deployable market-driven mechanisms, the overall findings of our work indicate that spot pricing
plays a promising role in the sustainability of Cloud resource exploitation.
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Cloud Ecosystem, Cloud Spot Pricing, Comparative Evidence, Systematic Literature Review
1. Introduction
Cloud computing has been increasingly acknowledged in
industry not only for benefiting Cloud providers by creating
more business opportunities, but also for relieving Cloud con-
sumers of purchasing, installing, and maintaining local com-
pute resources. To guarantee a successful and sustainable Cloud
ecosystem, suitable pricing techniques must be developed and
implemented [19]. When it comes to trading Cloud resources,
fixed pricing is the dominant strategy in the Cloud market
nowadays [XL13], [1].1 In particular, the most common pric-
ing scheme (namely pay as you go) is for on-demand Cloud
services, where employing a unit of service is charged a fixed
price per unit of time [AKK12]. Given the normally unpre-
dictable and stochastic demand, however, there would always
be unused resources in the virtually infinite compute capacity
of the Cloud. To help further and better utilize the idle compute
resources, a promising approach is to provide spot resources
at a reduced price so as to attract more demands with toler-
ation of service delay and interruptions [WQH+13]. In fact,
Email address: hezhang@nju.edu.cn (He Zhang)
1We use two types of bibliography formats: the alphabetic format denotes
the Cloud service evaluation studies (primary studies) of the SLR, while the nu-
meric format (present in the “References” section) refers to the other references
for this article.
a commercial spot market has been established when a spot
instance service was launched by Amazon in December 2009
[SYG13]. Given the de facto spot price traces that are generally
far below the on-demand prices, spot pricing is claimed to be
the most cost-effective scheme among the existing options for
Cloud consumers. More importantly, Amazon’s offering of spot
service has been regarded as the first step toward a full-fledged
market economy for Cloud computing [AKK12].
Unfortunately, there seems to be a lack of confidence in be-
coming Cloud spot pricing players in industry. Both providers
and consumers are still hesitating to enter the Cloud spot mar-
ket. For instance, the overwhelming majority of the existing
Cloud providers have not employed the spot pricing scheme
yet [ZG11], and the only currently available provider Ama-
zon is still using contests to encourage more spot applications
[3]. The possible reasons for not joining the Cloud spot market
could exist behind the limitations of spot pricing. Unlike the
static and straightforward pricing schemes of on-demand and
reserved Cloud services, the market-driven mechanism for pric-
ing spot service would be complicated for both implementation
and understanding. Moreover, since the overall supply and de-
mand of spot resources are both uncertain during runtime, spot
service consumers would have to suffer from the irregular fluc-
tuations in service price and availability.
Meanwhile, there are also conflicting opinions in the relevant
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academic community. As mentioned previously, offering spot
resources has been viewed as an effective approach to attract-
ing more consumers, fully utilizing the Cloud resources, and
generating more revenue [WQH+13]. Nevertheless, some the-
oretical analysis and simulation argued that directly using fixed
prices would bring higher expected revenues for providers than
employing a hybrid (fixed + spot) pricing scheme [AKK12]. It
is difficult to give a quick judgment on this even if referring to
Amazon’s spot service as a concrete example, because the pub-
lic can obtain little information except the short-term history of
spot prices.
To help alleviate the conflict in such a background and under-
stand whether or not it is reasonable to employ spot pricing for
Cloud computing, we conducted a systematic literature review
(SLR) [13] in order to rigorously identify, assess, and synthe-
size empirical evidence in favor of or against Cloud spot pric-
ing. In addition to analyzing the benefits and limitations of spot
pricing, we also distinguished between different theories [12]
proposed to describe/predict prices or explain/prescribe pricing
mechanisms in the Cloud spot market. Furthermore, we partic-
ularly investigated the fault-tolerance techniques developed to
address the limitations of Cloud spot pricing.
Accordingly, the contributions of this work are mainly three-
fold. Firstly, the systematically summarized discussions and
empirical evidence can help both Cloud providers and con-
sumers gain a quick impression of the pros and cons of the
spot pricing scheme. Moreover, this report is further able to
act as a checklist to facilitate cost-benefit analysis of offer-
ing/employing spot services. Secondly, the four types of rel-
evant theories can help both researchers and practitioners better
understand the Cloud spot market. In practice, the price pre-
diction techniques involved in the predictive theories would be
particularly valuable for Cloud consumers to make proper bid-
dings, while the various prescriptive theories would be able to
inspire Cloud providers to develop/improve their spot pricing
mechanisms. In academia, researchers may refer to the existing
theories to cross check and review new studies on Cloud spot
pricing. Thirdly, the collected fault-tolerance techniques aim to
give Cloud consumers an overview about how to achieve trade-
offs between economic benefits and service availability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly introduces the related work on Cloud spot pric-
ing. Section 3 specifies the SLR method and logistics in our
study. Section 4 reports an overview of the reviewed studies,
while Section 5 presents our main findings from this SLR by
answering the predefined research questions. A set of possible
threats to the validity of this study are highlighted in Section 6.
Conclusions and some future work are discussed in Section 7.
2. Related work
It has been recognized that adequate pricing techniques
would play a key role in the success of Cloud computing in
practice [19]. In the de facto Cloud market, different providers
have employed different strategies to attract consumers and sell
their Cloud services. In general, there are three typical pricing
schemes mainly based on Amazon’s specification [2], as listed
below.
• On-Demand Service Pricing scheme: Cloud consumers
pay a fixed cost per service unit on an hourly basis without
upfront fee and long-term commitment. An analogy of
this pricing scheme can be paying per view from a video
on demand (VOD) service through the Internet.
• Reserved Service Pricing scheme: Cloud consumers pay
an upfront fixed fee to ensure discounted hourly pricing
for a long-term commitment of service availability (e.g.,
1 year, 3 years). An analogy of this pricing scheme can
be signing a two-year subscription of mobile service to re-
ceive cheaper data plans with a free phone.
• Spot Service Pricing scheme: Cloud consumers bid on
spare resources and employ them whenever the bid ex-
ceeds the current spot price, while the employed service
will be interrupted when the spot price exceeds the current
bid. An analogy of this pricing scheme can be the dynamic
pricing in the electricity distribution industry.
Although the fixed pricing schemes are dominant approaches
to trading Cloud resources nowadays [19], spot pricing has been
broadly agreed as a significant supplement for building a full-
fledged market economy for the Cloud ecosystem [AKK12]. In
fact, a wide consensus on efficient management of resources in
our society is to avoid fixed pricing [17]. As such, spot pricing
(also dynamic pricing) methods have been increasingly devel-
oped and adopted in various industries ranging from airlines to
electric utilities [7, 10]. Nevertheless, considering the unique
characteristics of Cloud computing like location independence,
resource virtualization and rapid elasticity, it could be improper
to directly confirm the benefits of Cloud spot pricing by analogy
with that in other industries.
As a matter of fact, the recent intensive investigations into
Cloud spot pricing (e.g., [JTB13, LLLZ13, ZG13]) have deliv-
ered diverse and even contradictory statements. In particular,
the simulation in the study [AKK12] indicates that spot pric-
ing scheme would generate lower expected revenue for Cloud
providers, which conflicts with the aforementioned consensus
in most cases. Several survey studies tried to give an overview
of, and comparison between different Cloud pricing schemes
[1, 18][KKP15, dSdMSNG+12]. Unfortunately, none of them
emphasized empirical evidence for the comparison between
spot pricing and fixed pricing. Furthermore, these survey stud-
ies delivered confusing terminology and classifications to read-
ers. For example, various theoretical and mathematical mod-
els were directly treated as different Cloud pricing schemes,
whereas those models are essentially for explaining or imple-
menting the spot pricing scheme.
Our work focuses on the empirical evidence of spot pricing
in the Cloud industry. In addition to outlining an overview of
the benefits and limitations of Cloud spot pricing, we also re-
port a theory-based classification of the relevant studies for re-
searchers’ and practitioners’ reference.
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 Justify the necessity of carrying out this 
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Planning Review 
 Exhaustively search relevant primary studies in the 
literature. 
 Select relevant primary studies and assess their quali-
ties for answering research questions. 
 Extract useful data from the selected primary studies. 
 Arrange and synthesize the initial results of our 
study into review notes. 
Conducting Review 
 Answer the research questions by analyzing and 
interpreting the initial results and review notes. 
 Finalize and polish the previous work into an SLR 
report. 
Reporting Review 
Fig. 1: Review procedure of this SLR.
3. Review method
The comprehensive guidelines for performing SLR have
been specified by Kitchenham and Charters [13]. Here we
adapted the guidelines to this work and followed a three-stage
review procedure, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
In particular, given the existing experiences of SLR [4, 16],
we also emphasized the pilot review during Planning Review
stage. In fact, initially reading some relevant studies would
be crucial for understanding the domain knowledge and jus-
tifying the SLR work, which essentially brought the research
questions. Furthermore, during the development of the review
protocol, the pilot review can help gradually improve search
strategy, refine inclusion/exclusion criteria, and verify data ex-
traction schema by collecting pilot data. The remainder of this
section specifies more details we prepared for conducting this
SLR.
3.1. Research questions
There are inconsistent and even conflicting claims with re-
gard to the benefits of applying spot pricing in the Cloud mar-
ket. In order to objectively judge those claims, we decided to
summarize and analyze the existing evidence, and the work was
driven by the primary research question RQ1.
RQ1: What empirical evidence has been presented in the liter-
ature regarding the benefits and limitations of spot pricing
in comparison to fixed pricing in the Cloud market?
Moreover, as mentioned previously, the de facto mechanism
for pricing spot resources in the Cloud market seems still to
be a mystery. To help understand the Cloud spot market, it
is worth further investigating the backend theories proposed in
the relevant studies. In information systems, there always exists
multiple types of theories exposing assumptions under different
viewpoints, and different types of theories all can be valuable
[12]. Therefore, according to the classification of theory in [12],
we also distinguish between four types of theories related to the
Cloud spot market, as specified in Table 1.
Given the pre-clarified theory types, we further defined the
following research question to drive the corresponding investi-
gation:
RQ2: What theories have been proposed to describe/predict
spot prices or explain/prescribe spot pricing in the Cloud
market?
Considering that the limitations of spot pricing also imply
research opportunities, there could already exist studies focus-
ing on the potential cures. Thus, we also define a secondary
research question of RQ1:
RQ3: What techniques have been developed to address the
limitations of Cloud spot pricing?
Note that the research questions for this SLR were framed
obeying the PICO (Population, Intervention, Comparison, Out-
come) criteria [13]. In detail, the population here refers to the
participants in the Cloud market; the intervention is the Cloud
spot pricing including its backend theories; the comparison in-
tervention is the static strategies for pricing Cloud resources;
and the outcomes that are of interest to this systematic review
indicate the usefulness of spot pricing and fixed pricing within
the Cloud computing domain.
3.2. Research scope
It has been identified that there are unique characteristics of
and insights into Cloud computing compared to other comput-
ing paradigms [11]. Therefore, although extensive research ef-
forts on pricing in communication networks and Internet can
be found in the literature, we only concentrate on the pricing
studies in the domain of Cloud computing.
When it comes to the participants in the Cloud market, we are
concerned with Cloud providers and consumers without consid-
ering their external-party connections like with power suppli-
ers. In particular, Cloud consumers can be Cloud service bro-
kers, secondary service providers, or end users. As for Cloud
providers, recall that Amazon is the de facto vendor in the spot
market at the time of writing. To make our work closer to the
real situation in industry, we only consider the pricing scenario
where a single Cloud provider sells spot resources to its con-
sumers. Although a multi-provider spot market will very pos-
sibly appear in the future, we are not interested in the evidence
for a concern that is not yet a problem. Moreover, different
empirical evidence for different pricing scenarios could not be
compatible or comparable to each other.
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Table 1: Four theory types related to the Cloud spot market.
Theory Type Specification
Descriptive Theory This theory provides a description of the spot prices based on observations and/or statistical analyses, which essentially
considers the backend spot pricing mechanism as a black box.
Explanatory Theory This theory provides an explanation/clarification of the spot pricing problem, while the explanation/clarification is usually
intended to promote solutions to the spot pricing problem.
Predictive Theory This theory can simulate/generate spot prices without being aware of the causal demand/supply details, which essentially
considers the backend spot pricing mechanism as a black box.
Prescriptive Theory This theory provides an explicit prescription (e.g., methods, techniques, principles, functions, or a combination of them) for
realizing the backend spot pricing mechanism.
3.3. Search strategy
It has been identified that the rigor of the search strategy is
crucial for its corresponding systematic reviews [20]. A rigor-
ous strategy can minimize the bias and increase the confidence
of repeatable search process and consistent search results. To
achieve this, we emphasize the following steps: setting a pre-
cise publication time span, employing popular electronic li-
braries, designing a search string carefully, and using a manual
search to supplement the automated search.
3.3.1. Publication time span
As the commercial Cloud spot market was established in De-
cember of 2009 [SYG13], we particularly focused on the lit-
erature published from the beginning of 2010. Given such a
concrete case in industry, the collected evidence would be more
valuable and convincing for their practical motivations and vali-
dations in the relevant studies. Meanwhile, considering the pos-
sible delay of publishing, we only explored studies published
before mid 2015. In other words, we restricted the publication
time span between January 1st, 2010 and June 30th, 2015.
3.3.2. Electronic data sources
According to the statistics of the literature search engines
[20], and following the referential experiences reported in the
existing SLR protocols and reports, we also employed five pop-
ular electronic libraries to achieve a broad enough coverage of
relevant primary studies. Note that, as described in Section
3.3.4, the selected studies found by the automated search essen-
tially acted as secondary data sources for the subsequent man-
ual search (i.e. reference snowballing).
• ACM Digital Library (http://dl.acm.org/)
• Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com)
• IEEE Xplore (http://ieeexplore.ieee.org)
• ScienceDirect (http://www.sciencedirect.com)
• SpringerLink (http://www.springer.com)
3.3.3. Search string
We mainly followed the approach proposed in [15] to com-
pose the search string. Firstly, we derived major terms from the
aforementioned PICO-based research questions, as listed be-
low.
Population: cloud
Intervention: spot pricing
Comparison: fixed pricing
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Quickly 
Scanning 
Entirely 
Reading 
Reference 
Snowballing 
1009 61 59 84 
(1009−925=) (84−25=) (59+2=) 
(Auto-
search 
result) 
Fig. 2: Manual search steps (adapted from [6]).
Outcomes: benefit, limitation, revenue, cost
Secondly, we identified the alternative spellings and syn-
onyms for these major terms, and also supplemented the terms
by checking the keywords in the pilot relevant studies.
Thirdly, we used the Boolean OR and AND to properly in-
tegrate all the determined terms into a string for the automated
search:
cloud AND (“dynamic pricing” OR “spot pricing” OR
“market pricing” OR “dynamic price” OR “spot price” OR
“market price” OR “static pricing” OR “fixed pricing” OR
“on-demand pricing” OR “static price” OR “fixed price”
OR “on-demand price” OR “reserve price”) AND (profit
OR profitable OR revenue OR cost OR limit OR limitation
OR benefit OR benefiting)
3.3.4. Search process
The search process is roughly an automated search followed
by a manual search. The automated search is to run the search
string through the search engines of those five popular elec-
tronic data sources. After collecting the results from automated
search, we unfolded the manual search by implementing three
steps, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Note that the manual search here
essentially acts as data immersion [6] that facilitates data ex-
traction of this SLR, which also confirms the importance of pi-
lot review (cf. Fig. 1).
(1) Quick Scanning: An initial selection from the automated
search results was performed by scanning their titles, key-
words and abstracts against the inclusion/exclusion crite-
ria.
(2) Thorough Reading: The full texts of initially selected pub-
lications were read entirely to further decide their rele-
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vance to this SLR. In particular, the unsure papers were
discussed in our team meetings.
(3) Reference Snowballing: To explore the potential relevant
studies to the largest extent, we reread the Related Work
section of each selected study and then supplemented a
reference snowballing [14]. New papers identified during
reference snowballing were finally determined by repeat-
ing the previous steps.
3.4. Inclusion and exclusion criteria
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were mainly shaped
from the research scope (cf. Section 3.2) of this SLR. In detail,
the criteria are specified as below:
Inclusion Criteria:
(1) Publications that investigate the de facto spot market of
Cloud computing.
(2) Publications that propose new mechanisms to support pric-
ing/allocating/provisioning Cloud spot resources.
(3) Publications that perform comparisons between spot pric-
ing and fixed pricing in the Cloud market.
(4) Publications that develop techniques to address the limita-
tions of Cloud spot pricing.
(5) Publications that study requesting/bidding/applying spot
resources together with discussions about the Cloud spot
market/mechanism/prices.
(6) An overall condition for above inclusion criteria is that the
published studies consider a single-provider pricing sce-
nario only.
(7) Moreover, the above inclusion criteria apply
only to regular academic publications (Full jour-
nal/conference/workshop papers, technical reports, and
book chapters).
Exclusion Criteria:
(1) Publications that emphasize external connections other
than Cloud provider and consumer when investigating
Cloud resource pricing. To the best of our knowledge, the
external connections are normally with power suppliers.
(2) Publications that consider the competition among multiple
Cloud providers, or allow one consumer to employ spot
resources from multiple Cloud providers.
(3) Publications that do not include any discussion about ben-
efits or limitations of Cloud spot pricing.
(4) Publications that discuss pricing for non-Cloud computing
paradigms.
(5) Publications that describe Cloud-related studies with re-
spect to the fixed pricing only.
(6) Publications that investigate Cloud pricing in a generic
sense without distinguishing between spot and fixed mech-
anisms.
(7) Publications that are previous versions of the later pub-
lished work.
(8) Survey papers (secondary studies) that do not contribute
the first-hand evidence.
(9) In addition, short/position papers, demo, posters, extended
abstracts or industry publications are all excluded.
3.5. Study quality assessment
Recall that it is usually difficult to distinguish between the
methodological rigor and reporting quality of a research study
[9]. For the purpose of conciseness, and also by referring to
the existing SLR reports, we proposed to use five assessment
questions as Part I to examine a relevant study’s overall quality.
Part I:
• QA1: Is there a rationale for why this study was under-
taken?
• QA2: Is there a description and justification for distin-
guishing this study from the related work?
• QA3: Is there a description and justification for how this
study was conducted (the research design)?
• QA4: Is there a clear statement of the findings in this
study?
• QA5: Does this study present sufficient data/analysis to
support/justify the findings?
Considering that this SLR work is about comparative evi-
dence of Cloud spot pricing, we further defined three assess-
ment questions as Part II to measure the strength of the evidence
contributed by a primary study. In other words, we can use the
score of Part II to reflect how relevant the primary study is to
our SLR work.
Part II:
• QA6: Is there any description or justification of benefits
and limitations of Cloud spot pricing?
• QA7: Is there any comparison between spot pricing and
fixed pricing in the Cloud market?
• QA8: Does this study present sufficient data/analysis to
support/justify the comparison?
Answers to these quality assessment questions were assigned
numerical scores 0 (‘no’), 0.5 (‘to some extent’), or 1 (‘yes’). In
particular, we scored answers to the evidence strength questions
0.5 if the corresponding study only focused on Amazon, and
1 if the study discussed Cloud spot pricing in a broad sense.
In addition, we noted the information locations within a paper
according to which the assessments were made. As such, we
easily double checked the quality scores in our meetings and
resolved any disagreements.
3.6. Data extraction
To collect useful data to answer the previously defined re-
search questions, we employed a data extraction schema when
reviewing the primary studies, as specified in Table 2. We also
defined a set of data extraction questions to help clarify the data
element to be collected. Note that, the data extraction questions
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Table 2: Data extraction schema.
ID Data Element Data Extraction Question Corresponding
Research Question
(1) Reference key N/A (To help readers quickly fine a particular study.) N/A (Metadata)
(2) Publication title What is the title of the publication?
(3) Author What is/are the authors’ name(s)?
(4) Affiliation What is/are the authors’ affiliation(s)?
(5) Publication year In which year was the evaluation work published?
(6) Venue type What type of the venue does the publication have? (Journal, Conference, Workshop, Book
Chapter, or Technical Report)
(7) Venue name Where is the publication’s venue? (name of the journal, conference, workshop, or institute)
(8) Resource type What type of Cloud spot resource is considered in this study? N/A (Context data)
(9) Demand distribution What distribution/scenario of consumer demand is considered in this study?
(10) Application What application is considered to consume the Cloud spot resource?
(11) Provider benefits What are the benefits of using spot pricing for Cloud provider? RQ1
(12) Provider limitations What are the limitations of using spot pricing for Cloud provider?
(13) Consumer benefits What are the benefits of using spot pricing for Cloud consumer?
(14) Consumer limitations What are the limitations of using spot pricing for Cloud consumer?
(15) Descriptive theory What descriptive theory about Cloud spot pricing is proposed in this study? RQ2
(16) Explanatory theory What explanatory theory about Cloud spot pricing is proposed in this study?
(17) Predictive theory What predictive theory about Cloud spot pricing is proposed in this study?
(18) Prescriptive theory What prescriptive theory about Cloud spot pricing is proposed in this study?
(19) Techniques What techniques are proposed to address the limitations of Cloud spot pricing? RQ3
(20) Addressed limitations What limitations of Cloud spot pricing is supposed to be addressed in this study?
are essentially driven by the research questions of this SLR,
while the context data extraction aims to help judge the strength
of the identified evidence.
The data extraction work was conducted mainly by three re-
search students under the supervision of three researchers. The
extracted raw data were kept in a spreadsheet for subsequent
analysis.2 Moreover, the data elements’ locations in their cor-
responding publications were also marked, so as to help us
quickly backtrack and validate these data collected by different
reviewers.
3.7. Data synthesis and aggregation
Since the raw data we collected were mostly qualitative de-
scriptions, we employed the approach of thematic analysis [6]
to realize data synthesis and aggregation for our SLR. As sug-
gested by Cruzes and Dybå [6], the process of thematic syn-
thesis and aggregation drives different forms of the data with
an increasing level of abstraction, as shown in Fig. 3. The four
types of data forms are briefly explained below.
• Text refers to the raw data with qualitative descriptions.
• Codes are descriptive labels that represent different seg-
ments of the raw data.
• Themes categorize the initial codes into a smaller set of
concentrated-meaning units.
2The extracted raw data have been shared online:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vOcuiIHH-eNgIz0r-
0b4h3qwkZgTQqV0JhqLaf1e0pw
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 Coding 
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Fig. 3: Data evolution during thematic synthesis and aggregation.
• Model here can also denote taxonomy or theory that por-
trays a big picture consisting of higher-order themes and
their relationships.
4. Overview of the reviewed studies
Following the search process (cf. Section 3.3.4), we iden-
tified 61 relevant primary studies in total. In detail, the au-
tomated search initially retrieved 213, 99, 162, and 335 pa-
pers from ACM, IEEE Xplore, ScienceDirect, and SpingerLink
digital libraries respectively. As for the Google Scholar, we
only explored the first 20 pages of the returned results (i.e. 200
records). The manual search through Quick Skimming and
Thorough Reading eventually identified 59 publications, while
two more valid studies were found in the Reference Snow-
balling stage, as also shown in Fig. 2.
Through grouping the primary studies according to their pub-
lishing time, we show the study distribution over the past four
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Fig. 5: Study distribution over the evidence strength.
years in Fig. 4. The rise in the number of publications indicates
an increasing research interest in investigating the Cloud spot
pricing. Furthermore, in spite of the various conferences re-
lated to Cloud computing, more than 20% of the relevant stud-
ies were published in highly ranked journals, and the majority
of venues (six out of eight) are IEEE/ACM transactions. Thus,
it is clear that the academic community has recognized spot
pricing as a significantly noteworthy research topic for satisfy-
ing the needs of Cloud industry.
According to the quality assessment (cf. detailed scores in
Appendix A), the selected studies were overall well conducted
and reported. This confirms that our selection criteria have
excluded possibly low-quality studies (e.g., short papers with-
out sufficient evaluation). As for the strength of evidence, we
further portray the study distribution over different scores in
Fig. 5. Given the Exclusion Criterion (3), all the relevant stud-
ies have discussed the benefits or limitations of Cloud spot pric-
ing. However, not all of the studies performed comparison be-
tween spot and fixed pricing in the Cloud market. In particular,
the scores also reveal that Amazon has naturally acted as the
focus of and a concrete sample in many research efforts. More
than half of the discussions and comparisons directly aimed at
the de facto spot market. Only 11 studies further used simula-
tion or statistical analysis to justify their comparisons, and most
of them directly employed Amazon’s spot price traces.
5. Review results and discussions
The results and discussions of this SLR are organized fol-
lowing the sequence of answers to the three research questions.
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Fig. 6: The benefits of employing spot pricing for Cloud providers. Note that
one primary study may have specified more than one benefits.
Corresponding to the data evolution process (cf. Fig. 3), we cat-
egorize the benefits and limitations of spot pricing for Cloud
providers and consumers respectively in Section 5.1, summa-
rize four different theories for understanding the Cloud spot
market in Section 5.2, and list currently developed techniques
for addressing the limitations of Cloud spot pricing in Section
5.3.
5.1. Benefits and limitations of spot pricing (RQ1)
5.1.1. Benefits for Cloud providers
There are 34 out of the 61 primary studies recognizing the
benefits of spot pricing for Cloud providers. We summarize the
identified benefits into seven categories, as shown in Fig. 6.
Driven by the economics rules, dynamic pricing has been
considered to be inherently more efficient than static pricing for
allocating resources [KS13]. The efficiency of resource usage
would be automatically maximized under auction-based provi-
sioning mechanisms [TSK11], because the Cloud resources can
be matched to the consumers who have the highest valuation
[ZG13]. In other words, the spot pricing scheme can help effec-
tively discover the market value of Cloud resources [SZW+14],
especially when allocating relatively limited resources to a po-
tentially large number of demands.
In practice, the efficiency of spot pricing for Cloud providers
is mainly embodied in resource utilization and profit maximiza-
tion. When it comes to the resource utilization, a clear consen-
sus is that the spot pricing scheme can improve data centers’
utilization by attracting more consumption, because it allows
Cloud providers to sell spare compute capacity at lower prices
which would otherwise be idle [AKK12, AKY10, AVCP14,
AVCP15, BYBYST13, CVK14, DCL13, GCWZ15, KS13,
Liu11, LTH14, MD11, SD15, SMG14, SZW+14, TSK11,
WQH+13, YAK12, ZLH+14]. More importantly, since fixed
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pricing cannot effectively reflect the underlying trends in the
under- and over-demand scenarios [WRM12, WTS+13, ZG13],
spot pricing has been recognized as being a promising alterna-
tive to better cope with unpredictable demands and unbalance
problem in the Cloud market [XL13, ZGBX11]. Through de-
mand shifting, spot pricing can smooth out some of the com-
putation requests with monetary incentives and lead to a more
efficient use of Cloud infrastructure [KDF+11, Liu11, Wee11].
As for the profit maximization, the efficiency may be fur-
ther distinguished between cost saving and revenue earning.
By increasing the usage of spare resources, on the one hand,
spot pricing can help reduce the costs associated with idle in-
frastructure [BYBYST13, KS14, MHL+14]; on the other hand,
spot pricing can help accommodate various consumers to gen-
erate higher revenues [SZW+14, XL13, ZG11]. Moreover, it
was believed that spot resources essentially provide elastic-
ity to the fixed-price resources without real harm to Cloud
providers’ main offering [BYBYST13]. Although Abhishek et
al. [AKK12] argued that fixed pricing is good enough in terms
of revenue generation, more empirical studies have shown
that under particular mechanisms the spot pricing outperforms
fixed pricing by achieving more revenue for a Cloud provider
[KDF+11, KLCD14, ZG13, ZLH+14], especially when allo-
cating competitive resources to a large number of consumers
[WRM12].
Furthermore, spot pricing also has marginal benefits for
Cloud providers. For example, the spot-price scheme gives
Cloud providers a price-setting power to reclaim their com-
pute capacity when necessary [XL13], which can also be re-
garded as a freedom to dispatch Cloud resources to dynamic
demands [TSK11]. In particular, this control power prevents
Cloud users from monopolizing resources through the spot mar-
ket [MHL+14]. In some circumstances, as a marketing strategy,
Cloud providers may employ imitative spot pricing to create an
impression of constant change in a booming spot market, while
intentionally masking the truth of low demand and price inac-
tivity [BYBYST13].
5.1.2. Limitations for Cloud providers
Unlike the aforementioned benefits, the limitations of spot
pricing for Cloud providers are considered by 11 studies only,
and the concerns can be classified into five categories, as shown
in Fig. 7. Compared to the straightforward fixed pricing, the
spot pricing’s major drawback for Cloud providers is the dif-
ficulties and challenges in developing a suitable market-driven
mechanism [ZLH+14]. Suppose the spot market is formulated
as auctions, no matter whether targeting revenue maximization
or resource allocation, the corresponding optimization problem
would be NP-hard or NP-complete [SYG13, WRM12, ZG13,
ZGBX11]. In addition, implementing such a market-driven
mechanisms could require more effort and managerial over-
heads [XL13].
Furthermore, untruthful bidding and mutual cooperation can
cause a cyclical effect and eventually make a market-driven
strategy turn to be unprofitable for Cloud providers [KS13,
AVCP14]. In fact, the de facto spot pricing in the current Cloud
market has been considered to be too primitive to guarantee
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Fig. 7: The limitations of employing spot pricing for Cloud providers, discussed
by 34 out of the 61 studies. Note that one primary study may have considered
more than one limitations.
truthful bidding and fair resource allocation [WRM12]. In par-
ticular, Abhishek et al. [AKK12] believed that operating a spot
market could create price discrimination and generate less ex-
pected revenues than using fixed prices.
There is also a special concern about Amazon’s policy of not
charging customers for the interrupted partial hours, if the spot
service usage is terminated by Amazon [3]. In the worst case,
the uncharged time rises up to 30% of a spot instance’s total run
time [DTM12], which would become a burden and reduce the
provider’s profit [SMG14]. However, since this is Amazon’s
own policy, we do not treat this concern as a limitation of spot
pricing in a generic sense.
5.1.3. Benefits for Cloud consumers
As shown in Fig. 8, the benefits for Cloud consumers were
discussed by 53 out of the 61 studies, and most of the dis-
cussions concentrated on the cost effectiveness of using spot
services. Although the de facto spot service of Amazon may
still unexpectedly charge more than the on-demand option
[CKLN11], it has been widely accepted that spot resources
are on average cheaper (e.g., [JCC+11, KS15a, MD11, PRB14,
SYG13]). Such a consensus is mainly based on the investi-
gation into the current Cloud spot market. For example, the
quantitative analyses of Amazon’s price history show that con-
sumers can expect to save more than half the expense if re-
placing on-demand instances with the spot ones [BYBYST13,
JTB13, SYG13]. The empirical studies deliver even more en-
couraging results: with proper bids, the total cost of employing
spot resources can be maintained between 13% and 36% of us-
ing the equivalent on-demand resources [LLLZ13, MVB10].
Meanwhile, the spot pricing scheme has been claimed to be
able to improve customer satisfaction on overall Cloud perfor-
mance [XL13, ZLH+14]. Firstly, if there is a shortage of on-
demand resource, Cloud users can shorten their waiting time
by finding alternative resources in the spot market [KLCD14].
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Fig. 8: The benefits of employing spot pricing for Cloud consumers, discussed
by 53 of the 61 studies. Note that one primary study may have specified more
than one benefits.
Secondly, spot instances have been considered as accelerators
for small-scale jobs. For example, by employing suitable fault-
tolerant technique, the study [JT13] shows that the application
turnaround time can be shortened by up to 58% and lowering
the monetary cost by up to 59%; by employing additional spot
nodes in the MapReduce process, the study [CCS+10] shows
that the speedup for the overall MapReduce time of some work-
loads can exceed 200% with an extra monetary cost of 42%
[CCS+10]. Thirdly, if a spot market implements the mecha-
nism of combinatorial auction, trading different types of Cloud
resources would be more efficient and more convenient for the
consumers with complex requirements [CVK14].
Moreover, the free market structure behind spot pricing
can ensure fair interactions between Cloud providers and con-
sumers [Tai12]. The market-driven dynamic resource provi-
sioning also enables higher social welfare for the entire Cloud
ecosystem [SZW+14, ZLH+14].
5.1.4. Limitations for Cloud consumers
Similar to the benefits for Cloud consumers, the limitations
of spot pricing were highlighted also by most of the selected
studies (50 out of 61), as distributed in Fig. 9. The most
significant limitation consumers have to face is the compro-
mised availability/reliability of Cloud spot services. Given
the nature of spot pricing [3], a Cloud provider has the con-
trol over terminating spot services through price adjustment.
In other words, a spot service can become unavailable at any
time without any notice due to the supply and demand fluctu-
ations [AVCP14, AVCP15, CKLN11, DCL13, KM13, VB12,
VGB11, WRM12, YAK12, ZGBX11]. In fact, Amazon’s spot
price history indicates that consumers may still experience out-
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Fig. 9: The limitations of employing spot pricing for Cloud consumers, dis-
cussed by 50 out of the 61 studies. Note that one primary study may have
considered more than one limitations.
of-bid events even if their bid is as high as the regular prices
[CKLN11, JTB13, LTH14].
Consequently, it will become hard to analyze the availabil-
ity level of services or applications built on the top of spot in-
stances [GCWZ15], and the completion time of job processing
could be seriously delayed [JCC+11, CCS+10, JLYS14]. From
the end user’s point of view, the quality of those spot-instance-
based services/applications would have been deteriorated due
to their uncertain performance, which inevitably leads to nega-
tive impacts on the economic advantages of using spot service
for two reasons: Firstly, the quality deterioration might incur
penalties for failing to meet performance and availability ob-
jectives [HSSI15, MD11]. Secondly, if not used carefully, the
cheaper spot resources with frequent interruptions would even-
tually be more expensive than fix-priced, on-demand instances
with respect to the overall cost of a Cloud-based application
[CKLN11, DCK14, SMG14].
As such, spot pricing has been considered not to be a suitable
scheme for workloads with little flexibility [XL13], and spot
resources have been particularly reported as inappropriate for
supporting long running jobs [CKLN11, KM13].
Additionally, spot pricing seems complicated for Cloud con-
sumers to understand psychologically [XL13], and therefore
the inherent complexity could make it difficult to carry out a
wise bidding [AKY10, CLT14, JTB13, KS13, KS15b, LTH14,
MSJ14, ZG11]. Indeed, Cloud consumers might always face
a dilemma when making bidding decisions. On the one hand,
bidding low prices can result in extremely long execution time
without reducing much monetary cost [AKY10]. On the other
hand, bidding high prices can lead to a large cost increase with-
out decreasing much computation time [KS15a]. In particular,
bidding above on-demand price is claimed to be unuseful, al-
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though it might be intuitively attractive [GCWZ15, KS15b].
5.1.5. Discussion
For the convenience of reading, we concisely highlight the
collected benefits and limitations of Cloud spot pricing in Ta-
ble 3.
Through identifying these opinions about Cloud spot pric-
ing, we find a clear consumption chain in the Cloud ecosys-
tem, as shown in Fig. 10. In addition to the investigations from
the provider’s and consumer’s perspectives, the existing studies
were also concerned with concrete applications, and a service
broker (or secondary provider) that acted as a middleware be-
tween spot resources and their end consumption.
Although the relevant studies were unfolded from various as-
pects of the spot service consumption chain, a large degree of
consensus has been reached on the benefits and limitations of
Cloud spot pricing.
When it comes to the benefits of spot pricing, although dif-
ferent beforehand assumptions may make different studies in-
comparable, the majority of empirical evidence advocates that
spot pricing would be more profitable. A conflicting opinion
is that the fixed-price scheme can generate higher expected rev-
enue for Cloud providers [AKK12]. Since suitable mechanisms
should be a prerequisite of implementing spot pricing, it is pos-
sible that the simulation results could have been flawed by the
improper assumptions implementation in [AKK12]. In fact, by
analogy, the spot service pricing has been successfully applied
to different industrial fields [7].
Similarly, the discussions about limitations of offering spot
pricing were also intensive. A typical limitation is that the
complexity in backend mechanisms could prevent both Cloud
providers and consumers from joining the spot market. Fur-
thermore, Cloud consumers are particularly concerned with un-
predictably frequent interruptions when using spot services, al-
though in some optimistic scenarios spot instances could be as
reliable as standard instances.
5.2. Theories of Cloud spot pricing (RQ2)
5.2.1. Descriptive Theories
Descriptive theories only focus on the spot prices or the vari-
ation in spot prices (cf. Table 1). Given the observations on
Amazon’s price history, a major standpoint is that there is no
law behind the spot price variation [MD11, SZL12], and cor-
respondingly the spot prices are totally uncertain [CKLN11]
or randomly generated within a particular band [BYBYST13,
MVB10]. The spot service reliability varies strongly depend-
ing on bid price, instance type, and availability zone [AKY10,
BYBYST13, LTH14, RFB+15, KS15a].
To simplify their research work, some studies assumed
that spot prices followed a mathematical distribution like
normal distribution [MD11] or standard Gaussian distribu-
tion [MSJ14], and the spot price variations followed a semi-
Markovian process [SZL12, GCWZ15]. However, several sta-
tistical analyses have revealed that the normal distribution does
not fit well the price history [ZPL+12], while the Mixture of
Gaussians (MoG) distribution delivers better price approxima-
tion compared to the other distribution models [JTB13]. In
addition to the complex MoG distribution, the lognormal dis-
tribution can also adequately model the spot-price distribution
[KS15b].
5.2.2. Explanatory theories
When explaining the spot pricing problem, this type of theo-
ries proposed by different studies vary significantly.
Following the initial description about Cloud spot market
[3], the most straightforward idea is to consider spot prices
as results from auctions [AVCP15, CVK14, KS14, KS15b,
MHL+14, PRB14, SD15]. For example, since different con-
sumers’ bids are unknown to each other and the identical spot
resources are sold at an identical price, the Cloud spot market
was viewed as a continuous sealed-bid uniform price auction
model [ZGBX11]; considering that only losers are allowed to
repetitively submit new bids while winners have to remain with
their positions, Song et al. [SYG13] treated the spot market as
a modified version of the repeated single-price auction; sup-
pose the top-N bidders win and the spot price equals to the
highest unsuccessful bid ((N + 1)st bid), the spot market can
be modeled as a (N + 1)st price auction with multiple goods
[BYBYST13, KS15b]; while if taking into account the nature
of diverse demands of different numbers and types of Cloud
resource, the combinational auction was claimed to be best
suited for representing the allocation of Cloud spot resources
[WRM12, ZG13, SZW+14].
Consequently, game theories have been further used to model
the competitions that may happen within auctions. For instance,
the Prisoner Dilemma game and the Generalized Nash Equilib-
rium (GNE) game was employed to formulate the conflicts be-
tween a provider and its consumers [DCL13, KS13, SS12]; and
particularly, inspired by the attacker-defender scenarios, the sit-
uation of a single Cloud provider with multiple consumers was
modeled as a Stackelberg game [DCL13].
The existing studies also tried to specify the Cloud spot
market from engineering viewpoints. For example, Abhishek
et al. modeled the spot market as k parallel M/M/1 queues
[AKK12], and another work regarded the market as a faulty
machine driven by a semi-Markovian process with up and down
states [SZL12].
From the perspective of Cloud provider, the spot pricing
problem has been often translated into revenue maximization
10
Table 3: Benefits and limitations of Cloud spot pricing.
Cloud Spot Pricing Benefits Limitations
For Providers
• Efficient resource utilization
– Inherently efficient market-driven mechanism
– Improving utilization of idle infrastructure
– Reflecting trends in changing demand and supply
– Balancing between changing demand and supply
• Profit Maximization
– Saving cost associated with idle infrastructure
– Earning revenue by attracting more consumers
• Control power over unpredictable demand
• Difficulty in developing a suitable mechanism
• Leading to untruthful and cooperative bidding
• Requiring managerial overhead
• Creating price discriminations
• Generating lower expected revenue*
For Consumers
• High cost effectiveness
• Improving customer satisfaction
– Shortening waiting time for alternative resources
– Accelerating small-scale jobs
– Efficient & Convenient for complex requirements
– improving degree of overall user satisfaction
• Higher social welfare for the entire Cloud system
• Fair interactions between supplier & consumer
• Compromised service availability/reliability
– Increasing job completion time
– Deteriorating quality of application
– Incurring high penalty and/or cost
• Difficulty in making bidding wisely
• Psychologically complicated pricing logic
*Only one study claims that fixed-price scheme can generate higher expected revenue [AKK12].
problems [WQH+13]. In particular, the revenue maximization
was further formulated as a finite-horizon stochastic dynamic
program [XL13]; the virtual resource allocation was formed
into a multi-dimensional knapsack problem (MKP) with the
additional constraints [CVK14]; while Kantere et al. modeled
optimal pricing as an optimal control problem with a finite
horizon, and the demand curve was modeled by employing
second order differential equations with constant parameters
[KDF+11].
Nevertheless, a reverse engineering study doubted about the
market-driven mechanism behind the de facto Cloud spot mar-
ket [BYBYST13]. Given the nearly identical trend of price
changing history of different spot instance types at various re-
gions, it was believed that the spot prices were driven by a dy-
namic reserve price algorithms rather than depending on the
market activities claimed by Amazon. The pricing algorithm
upgrade might be rolled out in one data center first, followed
by other data centers [KS14].
5.2.3. Predictive theories
By using the empirical data from Amazon’s price history,
the regressive process seems to be a common technique to
build predictive theories. Through reverse engineering, an auto-
regressive algorithm AR(1) was developed to simulate spot
price generation, and the generation results showed positive
match with Amazon’s price traces [BYBYST13]. Unlike AR(1)
that tries to keep a linear relation between service availability
and prices, the autocorrelation function (ACF)-based algorithm
focused on the relation between price variation and the cor-
responding time difference, which also delivered encouraging
prediction performance [MD11]. On the contrary, the analysis
of spot price predictability claimed that using an auto-regressive
moving average model could not yield satisfactory accuracy of
price approximation [ZPL+12]. To achieve better accuracy, a
Multi-Layer-Perceptron (MLP) model with a moving simula-
tion mode was developed for short-term price prediction only
[WTS+13].
In addition to direct spot price predictions, the predictive the-
ory can also be spot instance failure estimations. For example,
by modeling the failure probability of a spot instance based on a
semi-Morkovian process of spot prices, the spot instance’s fail-
ure probability for the next bidding interval can be estimated
under a specific bid, which essentially implies the price predic-
tion [GCWZ15].
5.2.4. Prescriptive theories
The prescriptive theories in this case are normally proposed
solutions to the previously formulated spot pricing problems.
Corresponding to the auction models, the provisioning
and allocation of spot resources were mostly emphasized
for proposing pricing mechanisms, such as CA-PROVISION
[ZG13], greedy allocation algorithm, collusion-resistant algo-
rithm [CVK14, WRM12], and a multi-round combinatorial
auction framework [SZW+14]; while Song et al. [SYG13] de-
veloped an order-statistic-based online pricing (OSOP) algo-
rithm to determine spot prices without considering consumer
behaviors.
With respect to the game theories, equilibrium-related math-
ematical methods were directly adapted from the economics
field to the Cloud case (e.g., solving variational inequality
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Table 4: Detailed theories of Cloud spot pricing.
Cloud Spot
Pricing
About the Past About the Future
Black-box
Theories
Descriptive theory:
• Price variations are uncertain
• High price variability between zones and between
instance types
• Price variations follow a semi-Markovian process
• Prices follow the normal distribution
• Prices follow the standard Gaussian distribution
• Prices follow a mixture of Gaussians distribution
• Prices follow the lognormal distribution
Predictive Theory:
• Linear function of service availability and price
• Autocorrelation function of price variation and time difference
• Multi-Layer-Perceptron model with a moving simulation mode
• Semi-Morkovian process-based failure estimation
White-box
Theories
Explanatory theory:
• Auction models
– Continuous sealed-bid uniform price auction
– Repeated single-price auction
– (N + 1)st price auction with multiple goods
– Combinational auction
• Game theories
– Prisoner Dilemma game
– Generalized Nash Equilibrium game
– Stackelberg game
• Mechanical models
– K parallel M/M/1 queues
– A faulty machine
• Revenue maximization problems
– Finite horizon stochastic dynamic problem
– Optimal control problem
– Multi-dimensional knapsack problem (MKP)
• Unknown dynamic reserve price algorithm
Prescriptive theory:
• Resource provisioning & allocation algorithm (for auction
models)
– CA-PROVISION
– Greedy allocation + collusion-resistant algorithm
– Order-statistic-based online pricing algorithm
– Multi-round combinatorial auction framework
• Equilibrium-related methods from Economics (for game
theories)
• Optimization solutions (for revenue maximization problems)
– Lyapunov optimization algorithm
– Hamilton-Jacobi condition based approach
– Mixed-integer nonlinear programming
– N-armed bandit -greedy approach
[DCL13]).
When it comes to solving the revenue maximization prob-
lem, Wang et al. [WQH+13] adopted a Lyapunov optimization
algorithm with the basic idea of minimizing a bound on the
drift-plus-penalty term; Xu and Li [XL13] proposed an opti-
mal solution based on a demand model, the Hamilton-Jacobi
conditions, and a standard numerical approach; and Kantere et
al. [KDF+11] employed mixed-integer nonlinear programming
to optimize the service pricing; and in one of the experimen-
tal scenarios, the provider was assumed to set spot prices using
an N-armed bandit -greedy approach that repeatedly select the
greedy pricing action among a set of N actions [AVCP14].
Overall, the sophisticated prescriptive theories here confirm
that developing a practical spot pricing mechanism would still
be challenging, because both Cloud providers and consumers
often prefer simplicity in practice [KS14].
5.2.5. Discussion
Similarly, we further highlight the identified theories of
Cloud spot pricing in Table 4. In essence, the four types of
theories come from four different angles of the spot market. On
the one hand, the descriptive and predictive theories are more
consumer-oriented, while the explanatory and prescriptive the-
ories are more provider-oriented. On the other hand, the de-
scriptive and explanatory theories are developed mainly to re-
veal the knowledge of the existing Cloud spot prices, while the
predictive and prescriptive theories are proposed mainly to aim
at future spot prices.
When it comes to the research method, two opposite ap-
proaches can be distinguished in the relevant studies: the black-
box investigations are usually based on the statistical analyses
of Amazon’s spot price traces, while the white-box investiga-
tions are mostly based on theoretical models of market partic-
ipant activities. In particular, behind the explanatory theories,
we find two popular classes of domain-specific techniques em-
ployed from the economics and engineering disciplines respec-
tively. From the perspective of economics, Cloud spot pric-
ing has been treated as various auctions and games to reach
some equilibrium (e.g., the Prisoner Dilemma game [DCL13]),
as shown in Fig. 11. From the perspective of engineering, re-
searchers have modeled Cloud spot pricing as electronical dy-
namics with input/ouput factors (e.g., k parallel M/M/1 queues
[AKK12]) or mechanical dynamics within a state space (e.g., a
faulty machine [SZL12]), as illustrated in Fig. 12.
After all, it is clear that there is no one-size-fits-all theory
for revealing the secrets of Cloud spot pricing. As a result, we
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Fig. 12: Cloud spot pricing from the perspective of engineering.
find that different types of theories could supplement each other
for understanding the de facto pricing mechanism. For exam-
ple, as a descriptive theory, the likelihood of employing reserve
prices was claimed to be evidence against Amazon’s market-
driven mechanism [BYBYST13]; nevertheless, considering the
investment cost mentioned by some explanatory theories, set-
ting a reserve price would be reasonable for auctioneers to pre-
vent losses when demand was very low [ZG13]. However, we
admit that none of the economic models can explain the similar
price fluctuations of Amazon’s different spot resources.
Within the same theory type, we find that it is hard to aggre-
gate the collected data due to the diverse and sometimes contra-
dictory statements. Yet a positive side effect of the contradic-
tory theories is that people can use them to cross assess different
primary studies. For example, since the systematic predictabil-
ity analysis proved that normal distribution was inappropriate
for spot price approximation [ZPL+12], the assumption of nor-
mally distributed prices could have flawed the corresponding
work on spot service bidding [MD11].
In particular, given the rational and intelligent participants in
the Cloud market, it has been identified that economic models
would be more suitable than conventional models in the con-
text of Cloud spot pricing [PR14]. On the other hand, the en-
gineering models could suffer from simplified while improper
assumptions. For example, the study [AKK12] assumed that
there were always jobs coming up, and its simulation suggested
that a well-chosen fixed price would beat spot prices in terms of
revenue maximization. In practice, however, there could be jobs
attracted by spot prices only, and for these jobs a “well-chosen”
fixed price would not be easily chosen well in advance. Thus,
the conclusions in the study [AKK12] might have been flawed
by its unsuitable assumptions, which confirms our previous dis-
cussions in Section 5.1.5.
5.3. Techniques to address limitations of Cloud spot pricing
(RQ3)
Given the consensus on the major drawbacks of spot pricing
for Cloud consumers, most of the relevant studies attempted to
address the compromised availability of spot services. We have
identified six typical fault-tolerance techniques developed from
the consumers’ perspective, and two improvement approaches
proposed from the provider’s point of view. Although some
papers report composite or integrated fault-tolerance solutions
(e.g., a combination of four OS-level mechanisms is proposed
in [HSSI15]), we focus on the individual techniques only, as
briefly described in the following subsections.
5.3.1. Checkpointing
Checkpointing seems to be the most popular fault-tolerance
technique to boost overall computing performance and produc-
tivity [JLYS14], and sometimes to save the cost [PRB14], when
employing spot resources. In brief, the checkpointing technique
allows consumers to save their intermediate work when spot
service is terminated. A set of practical checkpointing strate-
gies developed by the relevant studies are:
• Adaptive Scheme: Checkpoints are taken or skipped at
a 10-minute frequency based on the estimation of ex-
pected recovery time in case of future service interruptions
[YAK12].
• Application-centric Scheme: This scheme is based on a
sophisticated event generation system that delivers deci-
sion to either take checkpoints or terminate spot instances
[KM13].
• Enhanced Adaptive Incremental Scheme: This is a re-
vised version of the adaptive scheme based on an adjusted
Markov model that takes into account both service revoca-
tions and hardware failures [JT13].
• Hourly Scheme: Checkpoints are taken periodically prior
to the beginning of each spot service hour [VB12,
YAK12].
• Rising edge-driven Scheme: Checkpoints are taken after
every increase (rising edge) of spot prices even if the out-
of-bid event does not happen [LLLZ13, YAK12].
5.3.2. Duplication or redundancy
It has been identified that Cloud spot service may only be
suitable for short-term jobs due to the possible frequent inter-
ruptions [CKLN11]. To increase the chance of satisfying longer
jobs’ deadline constraints, the duplication technique creates one
replica of each job that could run for more than one hour, and
the replicas are supposed to be deployed with different instance
type/datacenter combinations [VB12]. Considering that each
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zone has a strong dependency on its own price history, the study
[MHL+14] particularly suggested the across-zone redundancy
as a complementary fault-tolerance mechanism.
5.3.3. Lineage-based recovery
Lineage-based recovery works by re-executing the computa-
tion of the failed nodes [DCK14]. Compared to the other fault-
tolerance techniques, lineage-based recovery generally incurs
little overhead during normal execution. However, it does not
work if many spot instances fail at the same time. Therefore,
this technique suggests employing different instance types to
reduce the risk that all spot instances fail simultaneously.
5.3.4. Migration
The migration technique can be viewed as an improvement
of checkpointing. By using the checkpointing technique, the
suspended jobs have to wait until the spot service is resumed.
To avoid waiting for re-acquiring the same spot resources, the
migration technique suggests rebidding at a comparable per-
core price for different types of instances even from a different
datacenter [JCCY13, YAK12]. If successful, the whole image
of a spot instance will be migrated from its original physical
host to another host that runs virtual machines at other prices
and even with other pricing schemes [CLT14].
5.3.5. Nested virtualization
Nested virtualization indicates the architecture where a vir-
tual machine runs inside another virtual machine and a job runs
inside the nested virtual machine [HSSI15]. In essence, the pur-
pose of nested virtualization is to facilitate the aforementioned
migration, by having the complete control over the nested vir-
tual machine without requiring any privileged access to the na-
tive one.
5.3.6. Stop-and-redo model
Unlike the lineage-based recovery technique, the stop-and-
redo model will restart a job from scratch even if only one spot
instance fails, which is usually for a traditional database system
deployed in spot markets [DCK14]. Thus, the best application
strategy driven by the stop-and-redo model is to use as many
spot instances as necessary to finish the job in less than one
hour.
5.3.7. Service scaling down
Recall that the termination of spot instances would not
only interrupt the consumers’ applications but also reduce the
provider’s profit (cf. Section 5.1.2). From the provider’s per-
spective, the study [DTM12] suggested scaling down a spot
service proportionally to the increase in its price, so as to im-
prove the spot service’s availability. In other words, when nec-
essary to free some compute resources, the provider may sacri-
fice some capacity of its service for not terminating the relevant
spot instances.
5.3.8. Hybrid spot instance
To relieve the overhead burden of not charging the last par-
tial hour, the study [SMG14] proposed a Hybrid Spot Instance
approach that could share the fault tolerance cost between the
service provider and consumers, and meanwhile could make the
spot service more reliable. The Hybrid Spot Instance approach
is essentially based on the aforementioned checkpointing tech-
nique, and it allows stretching the user bid till checkpointing is
done when an out-of-bid situation occurs.
5.3.9. Discussion
As mentioned previously, unexpected service interruption is
the most significant concern for consumers in the spot market.
Then, fault-tolerance techniques would be crucial to help in-
crease practitioners’ confidence in using Cloud spot services.
In fact, although the widely accepted use cases of spot service
are small-scale, flexible and delay-tolerant jobs, suitable fault-
tolerance techniques have been demonstrated to be able to keep
the spot service’s availability level as high as using on-demand
instances [GCWZ15, OP12], and to make spot instances pos-
sible to support highly-reliable always-on online applications
[GCWZ15, HSSI15].
However, the existing fault-tolerance techniques are not free
[SMG14]. For example, checkpointing would inevitably oc-
cupy extra fixed-price resource (e.g., storage), while duplication
and migration would require more compute resources. More-
over, a rough trend we have found is: the more sophisticated
the approach is, the more cost it may incur. Therefore, the tar-
get of service availability should be well balanced, otherwise
in the worst case the fault-tolerance cost could overwhelm the
economic benefits from employing Cloud spot service.
Ideally, it is also possible to ask the provider like Amazon to
modify the spot market and improve its spot service’s reliabil-
ity [MHL+14], for example, using the hybrid spot mechanism
to allow finalizing a checkpoint before any termination. From
the provider’s perspective, unfortunately, such market modifi-
cations would not be desirable if they lead to fewer consumers
entering the usually more profitable on-demand market.
6. Threats to validity
Although we strove to perform the review activities as rigor-
ously and objectively as possible, the findings of this SLR study
might still have been affected by certain limitations, as listed be-
low. Readers may need to consider these validity threats when
applying the reported findings to their own work.
6.1. Completeness
It is possible that our paper selection does not exhaustively
cover all the relevant studies. First of all, as revealed in Section
5.1.5, different researchers could investigate Cloud spot pricing
from different angles with various terms and concepts. As a
result, the studies that have irregular descriptions of their em-
pirical investigations might have been missed out. Second, to
balance the possible workload with coverage, we searched the
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five most popular electronic libraries instead of looking up ev-
ery possible literature resource. To alleviate these two issues,
we employed a manual search by snowballing the references to
further identify as many missing relevant studies as possible.
Last but not the least, in order to maintain a reasonable effort
on literature search, we performed automated search through
the metadata (namely titles, keywords and abstracts) rather than
full text of the papers. However, it has been identified that
the search precision would be reduced dramatically by scan-
ning full text [8], and the automated search could inevitably
miss relevant studies due to the limitations of search engines
[5]. Therefore, we consider this as a known observation instead
of a limitation of this SLR study.
6.2. Reviewers reliability
Recall that our work concentrates on the empirical evidence
of spot pricing in the Cloud computing domain only (cf. Section
3.2). When collecting and synthesizing evidence, for this com-
parative investigation, we tried to distinguish the statements
about spot pricing in the Cloud-specific sense from those in the
generic sense. Thus, different reviewers involved in this study
could possess slightly different opinions in some cases.
To reduce the possible bias, we cross-reviewed the collected
data, and further discussed unsure issues in our group meet-
ings. Since this study is an international collaboration with
team members separated geographically, we largely resorted
to Skype and telephone for our group meetings. Although the
modern communication facilitates are convenient, the different
time zones still made it difficult for our discussion on a fre-
quent basis, which might also incur possible bias in the review
process. Compared to our previous practices, we put more ef-
fort on organizing meetings and making our discussions more
efficient in this study. To the best of our knowledge, few SLR
studies have reported their experiences of remote collaboration
on conducting SLR. Such a challenge could bring new research
opportunities in our EBSE community.
6.3. Evidence strength
When assessing the quality of the relevant studies (cf. Section
3.5), we supposed that their empirical work like simulations
and data analyses were valid, and the corresponding statements
and findings were trustable. Nevertheless, it is possible that the
primary studies could have been flawed by improper assump-
tions or unsuitable modeling of the Cloud spot market. This
could also be the reason why there are contradictory statements
about Cloud spot pricing. For example, the conclusion drawn
by study [AKK12] about the spot pricing scheme is contrary
against the other studies.
The ideal approach to judging the evidence strength would be
to replicate and compare those empirical investigations. How-
ever, the replication verification is out of the scope of this paper.
Thus, we highlight this possible limitation only as a reminder
for readers to take into account evidence strength when inter-
preting the results of this SLR study.
6.4. Industrial gap
As previously mentioned, there are few Cloud providers us-
ing the spot pricing scheme to offer service in industry, and the
only one provider Amazon might have employed artificial algo-
rithm instead of real market-driven mechanism to fluctuate spot
prices [BYBYST13]. Such a phenomenon could bring bias in
the existing studies and enlarge the gap between academic out-
comes and industrial needs. For example, when proposing de-
scriptive and predictive theories (cf. Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.3),
nearly all the relevant studies took or had to take Amazon’s
price trace to perform empirical invistigations. As for the ex-
planatory and prescriptive theories (cf. Section 5.2.2 and 5.2.4),
there is little evidence to show that those sophisticated pricing
system design and assumptions are practically aligned with the
real market [KS14].
We have carefully balanced our research scope to reduce the
impact of this threat. On the one hand, to avoid discussions
sticking to Amazon, we tried to distinguish the research focus
between on general pricing mechanism and on Amazon’s own
policies (e.g., Section 5.1.4). On the other hand, to make our
work closer to the current situation in industry, we have ex-
cluded studies on precurement auction (or reverse auction) that
considers competition among Cloud providers (cf. Section 3.2).
In addition, we believe that such an industrial gap also re-
minds our community of potential research opportunities in
this domain. For example, the industry still desires a widely-
accepted and easily-implementable pricing mechanism for the
Cloud spot market.
7. Conclusions and future work
Appropriate pricing schemes and techniques are crucial for
developing and maintaining a successful and sustainable Cloud
ecosystem. Through collecting, assessing and analyzing the rel-
evant evidence from 61 primary studies, our systematic litera-
ture review (SLR) shows that the academic community strongly
advocates the emerging Cloud spot market. Most of the relevant
studies reported encouraging discussions about and/or analy-
ses of applying spot pricing to Cloud computing. Although the
complexity in backend mechanisms could be a long-term ob-
stacle for both offering and employing Cloud spot services, a
set of fault-tolerance techniques have been developed to help
reduce some limitations from the consumers’ side. In the re-
view, only one study favored fixed pricing from the perspective
of Cloud providers according to its queuing theory-based anal-
ysis and simulation [AKK12]. However, we have doubts about
such work not only because of the opposite majority opinion,
but also because its improper assumptions could have weak-
ened the validity of the simulation result.
Meanwhile, this SLR also reveals that there is still a lack of
practical market-driven mechanisms to support Cloud spot pric-
ing. A possible dilemma is: economic models would be able to
better reflect the Cloud spot market, while the corresponding
optimization problems could be NP-hard or NP-complete. As
for the de facto spot market with respect to Amazon, although
reserve price is reasonable from the economic angle, there is
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little evidence clearing the doubt about Amazon’s spot-price
scheme. By synthesizing four types of relevant theories, we
confirm the existence of a large gap between the sophisticated
pricing models imposed by the existing studies and the real
needs in reality, because both providers and consumers would
prefer simple mechanisms in practice.
Overall, the findings of this SLR have raised our confidence
in the research topic of Cloud spot pricing. We would also ex-
pect this report to be able to increase practitioners’ confidence
in joining the Cloud spot market. Our future work will then be
unfolded in two directions: first, we will focus on the reusabil-
ity of the extracted data, e.g., developing a factor checklist for
cost-benefit analysis of being a spot pricing player; second, we
will put more effort on investigating practical and easily deploy-
able spot mechanisms.
Appendix A. Quality assessment scores of the primary
studies
The quality assessment has generated a set of detailed scores
for each primary study, as listed in Table A.5.
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